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Introduction 
The development of a professional identity is particularly interesting for 
those occupations that have a troubled emergence.  The hinterland 
between science and technology accommodates many such ‘in-between’ 
subjects, which appear to have distinct attributes [Johnston 1996, 1999].  
Some of these specialisms disappear in the face of culturally stronger 
occupations.  Others endure, their technical expertise becoming 
appropriated or mutated to serve the needs of different professional groups 
[Johnston 1996a]. 
 This chapter is concerned with one extreme of these interstitial 
specialisms.  Chemical engineering – a subject that by its very name is 
between the science of chemistry and the technology of engineering – did 
eventually become a profession, in at least some countries.  It had a 
relatively easy time becoming established in America in the first third of this 
century [Noble 1977; Servos 1980; Furter 1982; Reynolds 1983, 1986].  On 
the other hand, chemical engineering remained largely unrecognised in 
Germany until the 1960s, and has attracted a smaller professional 
community there [Buchholz 1979; Schoenemann 1982].  In Britain, the 
chemical engineering profession has evinced distinct transitions over a 
period of a century.  It emerged to become an influential contributor to 
western economies and one of the ‘big four’ engineering professions (along 
with civil, mechanical and electrical engineering) after the second world 
war, due in large part to the unmindful aid of an influential, if capricious, 
sponsor: the state.  Yet chemical engineers had a long and troubled history 
of contestation with other professions [Divall 1996].  Because of this, the 
British case is particularly appropriate for examining the continual re-
casting of the professional identity in response to external and internal 
pressures. 
 The dynamics of this profession, as for others discussed by Andrew 
Abbott, have been governed by jurisdictional disputes between 
occupational groups [Abbott 1988].  Inter-professional claims over 
professional tasks motivated and shaped subsequent organisational 
developments.  Survival in the competitive system of professions was 
promoted by the particular tactics adopted by practitioners to strengthen 
their claims to authority.  And the balance between professional existence 
and obscurity, in the British case, was decided largely by particular 
government policies.  The findings reported here are one strand of a 
project to understand the historical evolution of a single technical 
profession in relationship to others.  We will focus on the survival strategies 
of British chemical engineers, some key moments in their transition into 
‘professionals’, and their continuing efforts to reposition themselves in an 
evolving ecology of professions. 
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Origins 
The term ‘chemical engineer’ came into regular, if not common, use in the 
1880s, when a few practitioners in Britain (and shortly after, in America) 
claimed it as the generic title for people like themselves – those competent 
in the design or operation of chemical plants on an industrial scale.  Over 
the next three decades, however (that is, up to the first world war), they 
had little success in focusing any collective identity. 
 Chemical engineering emerged from a heterogeneous mix of 
workplace environments and occupations [Donnelly 1988].  From the 
beginning, jurisdiction over this occupation was contested from several 
others: the managers of chemical works, mechanical engineers, civil 
engineers and chemists working in industry.  Even plumbers could argue 
that chemical plants were mostly about pipework and protective coatings.  
Academics and employers, too, wanted to take a hand in influencing the 
work and any representative bodies that might emerge. 
 This competition was complicated by the range of technical 
processes involved.  In some sectors, manufacturing processes were at the 
forefront of chemical technology; in others, very traditional activities 
prevailed.  And functional responsibilities could cut across industrial 
hierarchies.  Thus the term ‘chemical workers’ included manual workmen, 
plant foremen, routine laboratory chemists and research chemists, through 
to plant managers with some responsibility for process control and perhaps 
design, to works managers and directors.  This occupational structure 
differed from firm to firm and from industrial sub-sector to sub-sector.  
Finally, chemical engineering was by no means the only title in play.  
‘Chemical technology’, ‘applied chemistry’ and ‘technical chemistry’ were all 
terms in common use.  Courses under each of these names sprang up at 
polytechnics and universities.  In these confused circumstances, it is not 
surprising that no significant attempts were made during the late nineteenth 
century to challenge the existing institutional jurisdiction over design and 
control work in the chemical industry. 
The State as patron 
By the second decade of the new century, five occupational institutions 
were vying to recruit recruit such workers.  In addition to the relatively large 
Institute of Chemistry and Society of Chemical Industry were three others, 
all based on the discipline of chemistry.1  But no single organisation – or 
named occupation – could claim undisputed jurisdiction over all aspects of 
the design and operation of chemical plants [Donnelly 1996].  This was the 
principal competition against which the would-be chemical engineers had to 
define their identity as a distinct professional group. 
 Yet the war temporarily transformed the prospects for the inchoate 
profession.  In an industrial pool already super-saturated with attempts to 
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organise chemical practitioners, it catalysed professional crystallisation.  
New political structures, erected with great haste by the state to provide the 
explosives and other chemicals needed to wage the war, provided fresh 
opportunities for ‘chemical engineers’ and provoked them to organise and 
to make new claims to professional competency. 
 This altered situation began with the development of new industrial 
capacity.  At the beginning of the war the British government was quite 
unprepared for the required scale of explosives production.  There was little 
capacity to produce high explosives either by the national ordnance 
factories or by commercial firms.  The government quickly recruited a 
variety of businessmen and technical experts to man an explosives 
committee [Moulton 1922; Lloyd George 1933].  Among the most important 
was the American manager of a South African explosives factory, Kenneth 
B. Quinan.  Quinan (1878-1948) oversaw the construction of enormous 
state explosives factories across the country.  The committee was soon 
incorporated within David Lloyd George’s new Ministry of Munitions, which 
was to become the most pervasive and powerful government organisation 
in British history [Adams 1978, Wrigley 1982].  Almost incidentally during 
this unprecedented expansion of the chemical industry, the Ministry of 
Munitions helped to legitimise chemical engineers.  It did this by creating a 
new technical problem (the need to rapidly scale-up technical plants and 
make them more efficient) and by providing an occupational environment in 
which solutions to these problems could be publicly demonstrated. 
 The so-called “chemists’ war” eventually mobilised well over two 
thousand technical workers with chemical and engineering backgrounds.  
While Quinan’s staff in the Ministry was populated with practically-trained 
engineers and administrators, the chemical factories were populated 
mainly with physical chemists.  Many had been hastily withdrawn from 
military service or seconded from academic posts.  The wartime identities 
of such people changed rapidly: their curriculum vitae show rapid 
advancement from ‘trainee’ or ‘shift chemist’ to ‘chemist-in-charge’, and 
then to ‘plant designer’ or Ministry Assistant, with a residency time in each 
post ranging from three to 24 months.2  Such designers and operators 
were soon identified by senior officials within the Ministry as essential to its 
goals.   
 Quinan, shunning publicity, diffident about professional 
organisations and seldom employing the term ‘chemical engineer’ himself, 
nevertheless found his activities exploited by a handful of British chemical 
engineers to further their jurisdictional claims.  The most influential 
protagonist was William Macnab (1858-1941), a senior war-time official in 
the Ministry and an authority on explosives.  He purposefully portrayed 
Quinan and his techniques as a symbol of what was missing in the British 
chemical industry.  After the war Macnab spread Quinan’s methods to a 
much wider audience through technical studies of war-time manufacturing 
that he edited and that were published by the government.  Postwar 
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educators saw them as up-to-date and exemplary texts on chemical 
engineering.  
 But the reports were intended to provide much more than 
illustrations of the value of chemical engineering expertise.  The first of 
them sought to justify the Ministry’s longer term goals in the light of its 
wartime accomplishments: the Ministry, claimed Macnab, could serve as a 
model for the postwar chemical industry [Macnab 1920].  By advocating the 
reconfiguration of what were characterised as the traditionally distant 
relationships between academia and industry, ‘chemical engineers’ were 
offered an opportunity to colonise territory in both sectors and stake out 
new ground for their embryonic profession.  The reports drew heavily upon 
a technocratic rhetoric, of ‘scientific control’ replacing ‘the old rule-of-thumb 
practice’, a discourse with deep resonances at that time with many other 
areas of industrial and political life.  While not picking out chemical 
engineering as a distinct discipline, the government did provide 
opportunities for its protagonists.  Lloyd George, for example, described the 
Ministry’s melding of industry, labour and ‘science’ as one of the state’s 
most important accomplishments.  Chief among the mechanisms had been 
encouragement for the formation of representative bodies.  Similarly, 
professional associations expanded amongst scientists, educators, and 
civil servants: the war dissolved many traditional occupational boundaries 
and enabled a greater degree of collective action [MacLeod 1976]. 
 Other initiatives by the state, even if not intended primarily to serve 
the interests of would-be chemical engineers, provided an organisational 
structure for the chemical industry into which new bodies representing 
them, or their allies, could fit.  The Ministry had brought together 
practitioners from disparate backgrounds; allowed them to share 
knowledge that previously had often been narrowly specialised, secretive 
or incomplete; dramatically and rapidly increased the scale of British 
chemical plant and manufacturing; fostered a new relationship between 
industry, government and labour; and identified the need for more 
‘chemical engineers’ trained along academic lines.  Perhaps most 
importantly, it released these officially legitimated practitioners at the end of 
the war to fend for themselves. 
Postwar organisations representing chemical engineers 
The immediate postwar climate engendered by the successes of the 
Ministry of Munitions infused the campaigners for new organisations of 
‘chemical engineers’.  It had vaunted a new concept that spanned political 
beliefs: that the economy should be organised on a corporate basis, with 
new chemical engineering institutions acting as intermediaries between 
government and interest groups in the chemical and related industries.  
Thus the ‘hybrid’ nature of this technical subject seemed to make it ideal for 
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a political role as well.  The organisers of these new bodies emphasised 
social community, national objectives and collective organisation. 
 In the last months of the war, a group devoted to chemical 
engineering as an occupational specialism was organised within the 
Society of Chemical Industry.  The stated purpose of this Chemical 
Engineering Group (CEG) was to promote chemical engineering research 
and the education of chemical engineers.  By articulating and spreading a 
body of specialist, codified knowledge, the nascent profession laid claim to 
authority over fields of technical expertise traditionally filled by chemists, or 
mechanical engineers.  Only a handful of mainly part-time, non-degree 
courses in chemical engineering were available in the late 1910s and early 
1920s.  While it was successful in focusing interest and promoting the 
technical aspects of chemical engineering through its activities as a learned 
society, the organisation was prevented by the SCI’s constitution from 
accrediting engineers.  The Group was thus prevented from anchoring the 
occupational tasks it studied to a distinctive type of professional 
organisation. 
 From the start, a number of members agitated for a separate 
institution specifically to recognise chemical engineers as professionals.  
Many of them wanted to build an alliance across traditional occupational 
categories.  The half-dozen chief organisers of what was to become the 
Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE) were prominent in at least 
three organisations linking government, industry and would-be professional 
engineers.  But the early membership comprised a bewildering variety of 
occupations.  This was matched by heterogeneous professional aims, both 
in terms of scale and execution. For a small but active minority of the 
organisers of the Chemical Engineering Group and, later, the IChemE, the 
prevailing theme was ‘organisation to boost national fortunes’.  They saw 
the professional development of chemical engineers as a crucial step in 
making British industry efficient and internationally competitive.  By 
contrast, most of the IChemE’s ‘supporters of formation’ had more limited 
aspirations, typically listing the importance of a professional qualification as 
recognition of experience, or the need to improve and regularise standards 
of training.  The first group was thus sympathetic to the postwar 
government aims and sensitive to external economic threats; the second, 
to the more local problems of professional rivalry over jurisdiction.  The 
leaders said they wanted a strong national industry; the majority simply 
wanted recognised jobs within it. 
 As something akin to a learned society, the Group throughout the 
1920s encouraged the development, distillation and dissemination by and 
among practitioners of the codified knowledge necessary to stake a claim 
for chemical engineering as a specialist technical occupation; the IChemE 
strove to build recognition among employers and others for the formal 
professional qualifications – based partly upon this body of practitioners’ 
knowledge and partly on the work of academics – that it quickly established 
     396
to ground the jurisdictional claims of chemical engineers as professionals 
[Divall, 1994].  But the lack of a clear consensus over the identity and 
desirability of the ‘professional chemical engineer’ – even among those 
who were ostensibly in favour of the project – was evident in the rapid loss 
of enthusiasm among such organisations for active support of the IChemE. 
 The strength of the established professional jurisdictions 
undoubtedly had much to do with this. The organising committee of the 
IChemE quickly identified its main task as fitting into the existing complex 
system of professional bodies.  Eleven other scientific and engineering 
societies were consulted, including the Institute of Chemistry and the 
American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), which had formed in 
1908.  Only the Institute of Chemistry met with them.  Despite some 
attempts to legitimise the British profession by characterising its American 
counterpart, the AIChE, as a model of success, contact between the two 
bodies remained limited, if amicable. 
 This lack of concern from most of the other professional bodies is 
not surprising.  Although in retrospect we can seen how chemical 
engineers threatened to perturb existing professional arrangements, British 
technical societies were adept at neutralising the threat posed by 
newcomers by permitting the foundation of a specialist body that then had 
to take a lowly place in the professional hierarchy [Buchanan, 1988].3  
Strong objections to the founding of a new institution were likely only if the 
newcomer’s claims to jurisdictional authority trespassed too far onto the 
central domain of an established institution, or if they involved a marginal 
field acknowledged to be of strategic interest.  These cases cover the 
objections to the founding of the IChemE.  The Institutions of Civil and of 
Mechanical Engineers, for example, were in little doubt that ‘chemical 
engineers’ should be resisted if they claimed a competence in the design 
and construction of chemical plant; this field was regarded unequivocally as 
their responsibility.  And the Institute of Chemistry was concerned about its 
own weak jurisdiction over the chemical industry [Watson 1976]. 
Defining the chemical engineer 
Such key organisational and political transitions created a professional 
identity for chemical engineers.  But through the interwar period, that 
identity was also shaped very much by different audiences in industry and 
academe.  For industrialists – as for the state – chemical engineers were 
made more visible by accentuating how they could improve production 
economics.  The first secretary of the IChemE, for example, identified the 
chemical engineer as ‘the man whose job it is to raise the efficiency of 
chemical plants’, and claimed that a doubling of plant output would be 
possible ‘if there were complete control by competent chemical engineers’ 
[Hinchley 1921].  Similar claims were made throughout the 1920s by firms 
manufacturing chemical plants.  A flurry of advertisements vaunted 
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economy and profit as the prime justification for chemical engineers, giving 
them a public profile for the first time. 
 For practitioners themselves, professional definition reduced to the 
set of educational qualifications and experience necessary for membership 
in the Institution of Chemical Engineers.  And beyond these lay definitions 
of the scope of the discipline, which became increasingly painstaking and 
contentious in the handful of university programmes that struggled to 
expand between the wars.  Such programmes grew out of  applied 
chemistry or engineering departments, from specialisms such as gas and 
oil engineering, and sugar chemistry.  Their success revolved around the 
ability to break down a process into a number of general steps that became 
known as ‘unit operations’ [Divall & Johnston, 1998].  
 The only power directly under the control of the IChemE leadership 
was the selection of suitable members.  The early Institution saw 
membership selection as a powerful means of raising the standard of 
chemical engineering practice – what could be called ‘occupational 
eugenics’ to breed an improved strain of specialist.    Through its 
membership policy, it could filter and prune the available pool of ostensible 
‘chemical engineers’ into a membership and profession of its own making.  
More positively, it could actively mould the skills of its younger membership 
by an explicit educational policy for training the next generation of chemical 
engineers. 
 Despite such potential power, the Institution admissions committee 
had to tread a narrow line.  Standards of qualification that were too harsh 
would create an elite profession, but one that was too small in numbers to  
become visible and effectively populate industry.  Too lax a policy would 
swell the ranks of professional chemical engineers at the expense of the 
reputation of the profession.  Either extreme would result in failure of the 
profession to become viable. 
 During the first decade of the Institution it attempted to set 
admissions standards and a syllabus for training.  Little consensus could 
be found amongst employers.  The largest firms were dismissive of the 
need for such a hybrid.  Some, by contrast, wanted a thorough grounding 
in physical chemistry, physics or metallurgy.  Yet others thought that any 
four-year course would be inadequate to supply enough chemistry, physics 
and engineering knowledge, as opposed to those who stressed the 
necessity of long periods of works experience before, during or after 
college. 
Interwar decline 
Competition for professional ‘space’ in industry and academe demanded 
the weapons of public recognition and certified status.  But while 
recognition seemed assured in the immediate postwar years, the support of 
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government in fostering educational programmes, and of industry in 
employing chemical engineers, proved difficult to sustain between the world 
wars.  One President recalled that the early IChemE was received with 
‘suspicious glances of other members of the engineering fraternity. . . 
feeble jokes of some industrialists and . . . almost complete indifference of 
our universities’ [Cremer 1950].  Without the legitimation of influential 
sponsors, ‘chemical engineers’ could not effectively press their claims to 
professional status. 
 Chemical engineers found that the postwar economic instability 
opened opportunities but just as quickly closed them off.  The IChemE was 
founded in a volatile economic and political climate, with no fewer than four 
Prime Ministers and three governing parties during its first three years.  
Despite these economic and political swings, the state continued to 
promote the consolidation and rationalisation of chemical manufacturing, 
culminating in the creation of Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in 1926.  
The new company controlled a third of chemical production in Britain.  
Further rationalisation of the chemical industry was much discussed during 
the early years of the slump of the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
 The claims made for the managerial expertise of chemical engineers 
suggest that they hoped to find senior places in the hierarchies of the new, 
much larger companies. But any such expectations were quickly dashed.  
Although some big firms were pleased to employ chemical engineers, in 
others the rejection was almost total.  Between the wars, many did not see 
any need to employ a specially trained ‘chemical engineer’ when the 
combination of two people – an industrial chemist with a mechanical 
engineer – was thought to be better.  According to the Appointments 
Bureau set up by the IChemE, the profile of available chemical engineers 
seemed to be a chronically poor match for employers’ expectations.  
Employers too often required unique experience or exceptional training.  In 
particular, chemists and mechanical engineers proved adept at 
monopolising positions of any seniority in ICI.  On the whole, the failure of 
chemical engineers to make significant inroads into the management and 
even the more lowly of technical posts in big chemical manufacturers 
meant that they were restricted to small businesses.  Here their talents 
were commonly perceived more in terms of being cheap jacks-of-all-trades 
than the industrial leaders envisaged by some among the IChemE’s 
promoters.   
 The IChemE’s council recognised, however, that competition by 
chemical engineers for social and economic authority did not take place at 
worksites as much as within those organisations, such as universities, that 
legitimate their jurisdictional claims; As Abbott has observed, boundaries 
between engineering professions tend to disappear at places of work.  The 
Institution therefore spent most of its energy in developing educational 
programmes between the war.  Thus direct confrontations between the 
expectations of the IChemE and those of industrialists were limited and 
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downplayed.  It was a safer policy to plan academic syllabi that in the long 
term might create an industrial demand for chemical engineers.  In this 
way, the issue of recognition in the workplace was largely sidelined for the 
more easily addressed problem of recognition in academe. 
Effects of the second world war 
A coherent and stable identity for chemical engineers could not be pressed 
without solid industrial or government support, both of which were absent 
during the depression of the early 1930s.  However, the likelihood of war 
provided unique opportunities for the Institution to press its claims and 
negotiate recognition.  For the first time since 1918, the IChemE was able 
to evoke the perception that the proficiency of chemical engineers was 
important – even crucial – for production in an environment of increasingly 
limited national resources.  And unlike the interwar period, when money 
was short, the state during the war lubricated the economy from its 
monetary reserves.  In this context of limited resources but abundant 
national determination, chemical engineers could advance their self-
portrayal as essential engineers of economy.  If the occupational status for 
IChemE members often proved prosaic, the preparations and, later, waging 
of war provided occasions for successes for the nascent profession.   
 In 1936, the Committee of Imperial Defence at Whitehall began 
taking an interest specifically in the availability of chemical engineers in 
Britain.  The President of the IChemE wrote a memorandum to the 
Committee drawing upon ‘the lessons of the great war’ which demonstrated 
‘an immediate need for soundly-trained chemical engineers’ [Levinstein 
1936].  For him, the coming war offered an opportunity to press educational 
programmes and assure full employment of his members.  The Honorary 
Secretary made clear his own vision of a hierarchy of relevant professions: 
he appended a paragraph pointing out that ‘the large number of chemists 
engaged in teaching’ should be considered ‘a potential source of men 
suitable for employment in minor chemical engineering positions’ provided 
they were given vacation training.  Chemists, and particularly those without 
industrial experience, were to be considered only as a last resort.  For him, 
the coming war signalled the chance to press jurisdictional authority with an 
attentive sponsor.  Thus conflict over the role of chemists and chemical 
engineers in industry was brought to government attention for the first time.  
 In the summer of 1938, when the Ministry of Labour sent a request 
to British engineering institutions to survey their members ‘in case of 
national emergency’.  This channelling of patriotic enthusiasm soon 
foundered on details, however.  According to the Ministry’s classification 
scheme, chemical engineers were to be categorised as ‘a rather secondary 
variety of industrial chemist’, complained the Secretary – not as engineers.  
While the government continued to neglect chemical engineers, other 
professions did not hesitate to usurp the occupational niche they had 
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staked out.  The Institution of Mechanical Engineers instructed its members 
that those engaged in the design and construction of chemical plant should 
be classified as a category under mechanical engineering.  Nevertheless, 
the ‘Mechanicals’ gave their support for a definition of chemical engineers 
as a distinct engineering profession.  The IChemE began to identify 
chemistry alliances as dangerous and engineering liaisons as serviceable, 
perhaps because of the preponderance of engineering-minded designers 
and consultants over academics in Council.  This courting of new patrons 
was successful: the IChemE succeeded in having the Registry 
classification amended, a re-categorisation that was trumpeted as a victory 
for the profession.  The grudging official acceptance was nonetheless in 
marked contrast to events in America, where the government had accepted 
chemical engineering as a distinct specialisation without debate. 
Postwar expansion 
Immediately after the second world war, Britain, and its chemical 
engineers, had mixed prospects.  New industries promised a rapid 
expansion, but the available chemical engineers were too few to do the job.  
The wartime growth of the petrochemicals industry – which was 
manufacturing chemicals from a new raw material, petroleum, instead of 
the traditional and more expensive coal – demanded technical workers.  So 
too did entirely new production processes such as synthetic fibres and 
biochemicals.  For the first time, there was room for new technical 
professionals in an under-manned economy.  Petitions by manufacturers’ 
organisations and the IChemE alike prompted the Ministry of Education to 
set up a variety of training courses in chemical engineering at polytechnics 
and universities.  Thus sympathetic trade organisations, combined with a 
government desperate to boost exports and to maintain an international 
influence, again became effective sponsors of the profession.  As a result 
of new training programmes, the number of chemical engineers trained 
went from a couple of dozen per year before the war to several hundred 
per year by the mid 1950s. 
 But after the second world war, the profession of chemical 
engineering was not only on the ascendant; it was also vigorously 
colonising new specialisms.  Nuclear engineering is a cogent example of 
this vitality.  For chemical engineers, the burgeoning nuclear programme 
had many similarities with the munitions programme during World War I.  
Both were copiously funded and controlled by the government.  And both, 
initially, employed few recognised chemical engineers.  The Atomic 
establishments were initially staffed with many ex-employees of ICI who 
had managed chemicals factories during the second world war.  Many of 
the atomic factories were set up at ordnance factories, sometimes before 
the old staff were even replaced.  There was therefore a very real 
continuity of purpose, occupational profile and institutional culture.  
Because of this, some within the Institution of Chemical Engineers 
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attempted early on to cite the connection between the processes used in 
the nuclear industry – chemical separation, handling, corrosion prevention, 
thermodynamic calculations – and the expertise of chemical engineers.  
They sought to extend their jurisdiction to this new domain of nuclear 
engineering.  The President in the early 1950s suggested that the older 
specialisms were threatened by the new profession: ‘with the lure of 
nuclear physics and electronics, classical physicists were a dying race’, he 
said, and ‘chemical engineers had to do the research’ [Hartley 1953].   
 The IChemE continued to identify itself with other engineering 
professions instead of with chemical organisations.  That year, at the 
invitation from the Civils, Mechanicals, Electricals and the Institute of 
Physics, the IChemE collaborated to form a joint body for the advancement 
of nuclear technology.  And chemical engineers did manage to insinuate 
themselves in the new working environments, too.  Over a hundred 
chemical engineers were at the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) by 
1956, and a 1958 survey found more IChemE members to be working in 
the nuclear industry than in either the plastics, dyes or food industries.  
Recruitment brochures from the government-owned facilities began to 
highlight opportunities specifically for chemical engineers.  By the early 
sixties, the UKAEA was second only to ICI in its employment of chemical 
engineers. 
 The new occupational pattern also reflected a new balance of power 
with other professional groups.  The formation of a separate and 
unaffiliated Institution of Nuclear Engineers in 1958 provoked the IChemE 
to pronounce that ‘the new industry did not bring into being a new kind of 
engineer, but was a new challenge in the application of existing branches 
of engineering’, an ironic echo of the criticisms voiced by other institutions 
at its own formation in 1922.  This attempt by the IChemE to expand its 
borders to include the nuclear engineer was supported by the head of the 
atomic factories programme, Sir Christopher Hinton (1901-1983), who 
joined the IChemE and promoted nuclear engineering as the ‘natural’ 
constituency of chemical engineers.  Thus the weight of the Atomic Energy 
Authority supported a new identity for the chemical engineer: not as a 
specialist in engineering economy, or a species of chemist, or a ‘hybrid’ 
engineer, but as a sort of renaissance man having a competency ideally 
tailored for the nuclear industry. 
 Nuclear engineering was not a unique case of professional 
colonisation; other subjects were similarly claimed.  The IChemE President 
in 1955 argued that mineral engineering, with its processes of ore 
treatment and extractive metallurgy, intimately involved chemical 
engineering techniques.  Yet other subjects were portrayed as ‘naturally’ 
ceding to chemical engineers owing to their emphasis on ‘processes’.  The 
influx of chemical engineers into environmental engineering, for example, 
seems to have occurred without significant contestation of territory 
[Schmidtke 1982]. 
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Consolidating definitions 
By the end of the 1950s such territorial renegotiation had had a mixed 
reception.  A 1960 editorial in Chemistry and Industry criticised chemical 
engineering as a ‘diffuse’ discipline still ‘in the hands of the chemist and 
thermodynamicist’ and for not having more actively colonised engineering 
as a cognate specialism.  Nevertheless, having found more regular 
government support through educational programmes and state-sponsored 
industries, the profession was on firmer footing. 
 Increasing international competition convinced large firms such as 
ICI to change employment categories.  Prior to 1958, only 10 chemical 
engineers had been taken on at one ICI site, but by 1964 a total of 100 
chemical engineers were employed, many replacing chemists [Reynolds 
1965].  The position of the chemical engineering profession with respect to 
the three largest bodies – Mechanical, Civil and Electrical – became more 
established when the government in the mid 1960s sought to regulate the 
engineering professions.  A new Council of Engineering Institutions (CEI), 
in which the IChemE strove to play a highly visible role, regularised training 
standards and professional conduct for the established professions. 
 Nevertheless, chemical engineers did not find long-term stability in 
their occupation despite professional recognition and ‘official’ sponsorship 
of this kind.  The early and mid 1970s were difficult times for the chemical 
industry and the Institution.  The plant industry was in recession owing to 
world-wide overproduction of chemicals.  New chemical engineering 
processes were no longer appearing at the same heady pace as during the 
1950s.  The consequent lack of demand for engineers following this boom 
was exacerbated by two other factors.  First, the price increases and 
embargo of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1973-74 
led to a general energy crisis in Britain and other western countries.  More 
directly, the chemical plant explosion at Flixborough in 1974 damaged the 
reputation of chemical engineers and the chemical industry as much as 
previous concerns over environmental pollution had done. 
 Some observers presented this crisis for the profession positively, 
as a means of entering new disciplinary territory; others saw the new 
decade as heralding the end of a temporary and market-driven profession.  
While chemical engineers may have been valuable in increasing the 
efficiency of processes in industries built by loose collaborations of 
chemists and mechanical engineers, went the argument, declining 
industries no longer needed as many engineers as the academic world 
produced. 
 Such mixed opportunities and lack of consensus have extended to 
the present day.  The chemical engineering profession was gradually 
moving away from the chemical industry, but still staked its claim on 
influencing the process dimension of many other industries.  The 
          
 
403
professional environment in Britain was complicated by a new series of 
government interactions aimed at restructuring the technical professions 
and the CEI: the Finniston report on the engineering professions in 1980, 
leading to the Engineering Council (1982) and the Fairclough proposals for 
its extension in the early 1990s [Jordan 1992].  They sought to reduce the 
number of engineering institutions by encouraging mergers.  The possibility 
of changing the name of the Institution of Chemical Engineers to ‘Process 
Engineers’ was mooted in the 1980s.  The Institution considered, but 
ultimately rejected, mergers with the Society of Chemical Industry, Institute 
of Energy, Institutions of Production Engineers and Plant Engineers, and 
others.  Despite its continued independence in the plethora of chartered 
engineering institutions and bodies for technician engineers and 
engineering technicians, admitted its President in the mid 1980s, ‘the 
IChemE is but one cog’ [Beveridge 1985]. 
Conclusions: boundary disputes and sponsorship 
Establishing a ‘space’ in the ecology of professions had been the long-
standing concern of British chemical engineers.  The tactics of their 
Institution varied with time and circumstance.  But in the peculiarly British 
context of the engineering professions, the catalysing events centred 
around wars and their aftermaths.  During and after the first world war, 
chemical engineers were singled out and imbued with qualities closely 
linked to the political mood and national recovery, as ‘engineers of 
efficiency’ or as ‘industrial managers’.  Between the wars, they reverted, 
though, to an unattractive species of hybrid chemist.  After the second 
world war, they were again portrayed as a crucial specialism for 
international competition, again from an economic and military perspective, 
but this time as a scientifically-based generalist or unifying profession.  
While this crucial government support for the profession was transitory, it 
permitted protagonists to use their advantage to first insinuate themselves 
among established professions and then to dominate some of the new sub-
professions that appeared after the second world war.  Alliances with 
engineering, rather than scientific, specialists proved more workable in the 
long run, although the IChemE courted bodies in both domains at various 
periods.  The irony for chemical engineers is that, while the chameleon-like 
strategy of adapting identity has helped them survive, they remain perhaps 
the least identifiable of the technical professions. 
 From this particular historical case study come some general 
conclusions relevant to British technological professions, and arguably to 
professions as a whole.  First, the assumption of the ‘homogeneity’ of the 
profession is largely a mirage.  While there was unquestionably a 
marshalling of the members and leadership against ‘external’ threats, it 
remains true that the adminstrators were drawn from factions that had 
goals as distinct as business promotion and government co-operation, and 
that the rank and file membership had distinct sets of professional 
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motivations.  Second, the establishment and maintenance of professional 
jurisdiction for this ‘profession of capital’ demanded continual and energetic 
efforts on the part of its representative institution.  And third, alliances and 
patronage can play a vital role for an emerging profession.  Studying the 
sponsors, accomplices and adversaries can therefore reveal much about 
the profession itself. 
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Notes 
1. The Association of Chemical Technologists (1911), becoming the 
Institution of Chemical Technologists (1914); British Association of 
Chemists (1917); National Association of Industrial Chemists (1917). 
2. Application forms for the Institution of Chemical Engineers, Rugby, 
UK. 
3. The Institution of Mining and Metallurgy, for example, had obtained a 
Royal Charter in 1915, and the Institutions of Gas Engineers and of 
Mechanical Engineers were then seeking one. 
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